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HOW DOES SCIENCE COME TO SPEAK IN
THE COURTS?
CITATIONS, INTERTEXTS, EXPERT
WITNESSES, CONSEQUENTIAL FACTS,
AND REASONING
CHARLES BAZERMAN*
I
INTRODUCTION
Citations, in their highly conventionalized forms, visibly indicate each text’s
explicit use of the prior literature that embodies the knowledge and contentions
of its field. Each text explicitly and implicitly invokes prior literature in order to
provide resources for its claims, to identify issues at stake, to define its unique
claim, and to create a stance toward all that has gone before. This relation to
prior texts has been called intertextuality in literary and literacy studies. Because
science and law are both complex, communal projects deeply reliant on the
existence and production of texts, the study of intertextuality in each can tell us
much about how each field operates and what it accomplishes as a communal,
literate project. Studying how the intertextual systems of both meet in court can
help us understand more deeply the ways in which science and the scientific
literature are and are not consequential for legal deliberative processes.
In this Article I first put citation practices and intertextuality in science and
the law in theoretical and historical perspective, and then consider the
intersection of science and law by identifying the judicial rules that limit and
shape the role of scientific literature in court proceedings. One particular focus
is the idiosyncrasies of the U.S. legal system that have specific consequences for
both scientific and legal intertextuality in judicial reasoning. As an exploratory
example of how these issues work in practice, I look at litigation surrounding
phenylpropanolamine (PPA), with particular attention to one crucial study and
one crucial case. The analysis of the court documents focuses particularly on the
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judicial opinion as the site of judicial reasoning, though there are many other
sites of legal argument that precede the judge’s rulings.
Both from the historical and theoretical analysis and from the evidence of
this one case, it is clear that, in the United States, judicial reasoning is an
intertextually tight and self-referring system that pays only limited attention to
documents outside the laws, precedents, and judicial rules. The window for
scientific literature to enter the courts is narrow, focused, and highly filtered. It
serves as a warrant for the expert witnesses’ expertise, which in turn makes
opinion admissible in a way not available to ordinary witnesses. In an
adversarial system, the way to attack the opinion of an expert witness or to
make the witness and testimony inadmissible is in fact to attack the professional
standing of the literature on which the witness relies. Although the ruling in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1 approached this state of affairs
with a particular set of rules, the tension goes deeper than the particulars of the
Daubert rules or the ways in which they have been applied.
II
CITATION FORM AND INTERTEXTUALITY
No aspect of academic writing seems so conventional as citation format. It is
the subject of tedious stylebooks, which define arcane rules of punctuation,
abbreviation, and information requirements that are policed beyond the point
of irritation by editors and instructors, requiring endless last-minute work by
writers who did not have the foresight to anticipate all the conventional
requirements when first beginning the project.2 The stylebooks seem so
unsubstantive and yet so demanding—the epitome of empty convention. But of
course there are reasons for getting citations right: to provide accurate and
convenient access to the literature cited, so readers can follow the author back
to his sources—not just to check up on his honesty and trustworthiness, but
because each statement rests on an intertextual world of prior meanings,
reasonings, reported facts, and theories. Each new statement draws on and
focuses a previous discussion and history of communal work. Each reader
potentially has a stake in that discussion and, in response, can be drawn further
into the relevant literature. Each new statement using that literature provides a
new framework of relevance and interpretation as applied to the issue at hand.
Whereas the body of the new text provides the substantive and conceptual
synthesis, interpretation, and deployment of the prior discussions, the citations
provide the logistical, technical access to that literature. As such, they give clues
to how that literature is organized and what the reader needs to know to locate
any specific item in the archive of knowledge. These directions for finding the
literature specifically point the reader to certain spots where only specific kinds

1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. See, e.g., THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et
al. eds., 18th ed. 2005).

06_BAZERMAN__CONTRACT PROOF_.DOC

Winter 2009]

HOW DOES SCIENCE COME TO SPEAK IN THE COURTS?

4/2/2009 11:13:09 AM

93

of documents on particular topics are to be found. The documents provide the
relevant domain of discussion. Thus, the genres and topics of biochemistry
literature pointed to by the citation formats and bibliographic tools of that field
are distinct from those of trademark litigation, and both are distinct from those
of forensic accounting–each with its distinct citation practices and bibliographic
tools.3
Each field of professional endeavor has its own methods of citation,
developed from the dynamics of its work and the accidents of its history. These
citation practices reflect and are part of the organization of the professional
literature and help define what is important to know about the literature and
how one should access it. Indeed, the conventions of citations arose out of
managing the texts that emerged historically as relevant to the evolving field
and that were part and parcel of its manner of work and reasoning. The
problem that those contributing to this symposium aim to understand—how
scientific knowledge is used in public policy and law—can be seen as a technical
problem in intertextuality: When, how, in what form, and through what vehicle
does the literature of science (embodying the knowledge of that field) enter
into the textualized discussion of the differently organized domains of law,
litigation, and public policy? Once elements of that scientific literature are
admitted to other domains in forms acceptable and appropriate to those
domains, how are these transformed texts used, with what standing, and with
what consequences?
It is within the successful speech acts of those texts—those enduring
utterances that create the record of the professional endeavor—that the facts of
the endeavor (whether law, science, bureaucratic registry, or sports history) are
established and used to come to conclusions. Further, the facts remain in the
relevant literature for others to build on, use, or attempt to write over with new
facts. Whatever the world is outside the textualized endeavors, to be part of the
calculation, memory, and continuing thought of these literate endeavors, the
facts must be inscribed within the relevant texts in a way that will be perceived
as having both standing within its field and the robustness to continue that
standing. Those texts provide the common knowledge and reference point for
all individuals versed in the field. Nonetheless, for those textually located facts
in the archive of the field to have meaning and relevance in any new or current
issue before the field, these prior texts must be reprised and invoked either
explicitly or implicitly, so that they are alive in the new space of calculation.4
3. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF SCI. EDITORS, SCIENTIFIC STYLE AND FORMAT: THE CSE MANUAL
FOR AUTHORS, EDITORS, AND PUBLISHERS (7th ed. 2006); Editorial Policy and Style Information,
ACCT. REV. (Am. Acct. Ass’n, 2008), available at http://aaahq.org/pubs/EdPolicies/REV_EdPolicy.pdf.
4. For the theoretical underpinnings of this chapter as articulated in this paragraph, see generally
J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà eds., Harvard Univ.
Press 1975) (1962) (discussing speech-act theory); Charles Bazerman, Intertextualities: Volosinov,
Bakhtin, Literary Theory, and Literacy Studies, in BAKHTINIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LANGUAGE,
LITERACY, AND LEARNING 53 (Arnetha F. Ball & Sarah Warshauer Freedman eds., 2004) (parsing
Bakhtin’s theory of intertextuality); CHARLES BAZERMAN, SHAPING WRITTEN KNOWLEDGE: THE
GENRE AND ACTIVITY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL ARTICLE IN SCIENCE (1988) (setting out the history
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A. Inscribing Justice: The Law as a System of Literate and Communal Order
Law as an activity system serves to regulate human behavior through an
ordered system of laws, providing rules for behavior, punishment, liability, and
recompense, and applied to specific cases and adjudicated in the courts.
Through legal action, everyday matters are brought into the disciplines of law.
Courts become theatres of determination, looking for closure at the end of each
performance or episode, inscribing culpability, damage, reward, and
punishment, and reaffirming a legal order that sets the stage for all future legal
actions. Related episodes will follow with different actors, settings, and facts. At
the end of each episode, rewards, punishments, liabilities, and benefits must be
distributed and settled so life can go on. In its role as the theatre for these
actions, courts determine facts of events, intentions, and injuries—issues of
human social life and meaning—that must be set aright by the system of justice
to maintain social order.
Courts do not seek, as a direct aim, the best account of nature or scientific
causality, though judgments on these matters may enter incidentally in judging
human actions and injury as, for example, intentional or inadvertent. Further,
courts render judgment only on the immediate matter at hand, although
judgment as to other, subsidiary matters may be involved, as well, and although
the reasoning and principles invoked may be consequential as precedent. If the
evidence or reasoning is inadequate to determine culpability or injury, by
whatever standard the law determines for the criminal or civil case, the case is
decided for the defense. If the court is caught in a dilemma, it works its way
through the dilemma via more legal reasoning. The appellate process that
reexamines cases is entirely about legal procedures and reasoning, not about
the facts of the case, which are determined in the trial court. Opening up a case
for new evidence is permitted only in certain instances and carries a higher
standard and specific focus. Even then, the matter is usually sent back to the
trial court, especially in U.S. criminal cases, though less so in civil proceedings.
The court’s judgment is made by a single individual or a panel. In the
United States, this judgment is cast in a written statement—whether in the
and spread of a central scientific genre over four centuries); Charles Bazerman, Systems of Genres and
the Enactment of Social Intentions, in GENRE AND THE NEW RHETORIC 79 (Aviva Freedman & Peter
Medway eds., 1994) (theorizing the orderly relationship of genres within organized activity systems);
Charles Bazerman, Singular Utterances: Realizing Local Activities Through Typified Forms in Typified
Circumstances, in ANALYZING PROFESSIONAL GENRES (Anna Trosborg ed., 2000) (examining how
specific forms of information appear and are reasoned about within relevant genres); Charles
Bazerman, Textual Performance: Where the Action at a Distance Is, 23 J. ADVANCED COMPOSITION
379, no. 2 (2003) (considering how meanings and actions are accomplished at a distance through
writing); H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959) (setting out how
interpersonal actions are accomplished in speech); G.H. MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY (1934)
(identifying the role of social communication in the formation of identity and cognition); David R.
Russell, Rethinking Genre in School and Society: An Activity Theory Analysis, 14 WRITTEN COMM. 504
(1997) (providing a structural model for understanding the relationship between genres in different
activity systems); JOHN SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS (1969) (elaborating technical issues in speech-act
theory); WILLIAM I. THOMAS, THE UNADJUSTED GIRL (Comm. on Publ’ns of the Am. Inst. of
Criminal Law and Criminology ed., 1923) (observing the sociological concept of social facts).
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summary form of a jury ballot or the more extended statement of a judge’s
opinion. Once the judgment enters the record, the conclusion stands as law
unless overturned by a higher court. The opinion written by the judge further
sorts out the relevancy and relationships of the various evidence and arguments
with respect to law and precedent, thereby setting the file in order.
The law is conservative. New laws are sought only as the conditions of life,
community values, and perceptions of problems change, so that a rule of law
can then once again be imposed on an unruly world. Even progressive,
pragmatic orientations to the law always focus backwards to precedent,
introducing change only gradually. Both criminal and civil-court cases attempt
to place the particulars of each case and problematic circumstance into that rule
of law. In Roman and Napoleonic law, this conservatism and text-boundedness
are particularly strong: the law is taught and treated as a rational, self-contained
system, although the history of its interpretation and application as decisions
and commentary must always have weight, and thus some bearing, on each case
and on the code. Nonetheless, orderly access to the statutory law has been at
the heart of the intertextual system within the Roman and Napoleonic systems,
and references are mediated through the editors or compilers of the law.5 Thus
Justinian’s Institutes, Code, and the lost and recovered Digest became the keys
to citation practice through the medieval period, drawing on the volume name
and then the incipit or initial words of the statute.6
B. Common Law, Precedent, and Judicial Opinion in Britain and the United
States
In medieval England, practices of statutory citation developed using the
name of the act and the year of the monarch’s reign or parliamentary meeting.
By the mid-sixteenth century, however, the dominant printer of legal texts in
England, Richard Tottell, and the bibliographic system he imposed on his
legislative yearbooks became the standard for citations.7 This citation format
reinforced Tottell’s volumes as the definitive location of texts, and other
printers found it useful to copy his organization even to the numbering of the
folios or the pagination.8
Anglo-American law has evolved with a further wrinkle in inscribing the
world into the law, so that it may be regulated by the law. Because of the legal
standing given to customary or common law that existed outside royal and
parliamentary determination, the history of judicial decisions carries special
weight in determining what the law in any particular case may be and how it is

5. See Byron D. Cooper, Anglo-American Legal Citation: Historical Development and Library
Implications, 75 LAW LIBR. J. 3, 4–6 (1982) (providing a history of the English origin of citation
practices as derived from the Romans in the Middle Ages).
6. See id.
7. Id. at 9–10.
8. See id. at 10 (describing Tottell’s practice of standardizing foliation).

06_BAZERMAN__CONTRACT PROOF_.DOC

96

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

4/2/2009 11:13:09 AM

[Vol. 72:91

to be applied. This means that, in addition to the crafted logic of legislative
statutes, the various judicial opinions carry weight in creating new law.
In England, the unwritten law, carried in the memories and judgments of the
judges and elite barristers, still has standing. Its emphasis is not on the exact
wording of the opinion, but on its decision and its underlying principle. The
development of printing provided an increasingly accurate written record,
which served as a memory aide and as more-certain evidence of the oral
opinion. Again, the indexing system and pagination of the leading publishers
became the standard, helping to maintain the place of those practices in the
market, though over time new indexes replaced the old.9 Still, as with statutory
law, it was the leading commercial compilation products that defined and
maintained bibliographic order, and became key reference points for access to
the law. This commercial compilation and ordering also helped maintain a
coherence and finiteness to the legally relevant corpus.10
In the United States, however, the common law has been textualized as
much as the statutory law. Almost from the beginning of the republic, appellate
judges were required to write their opinions,11 and this is what the common law
has come to consist of.12 Although the statutes that might bear on any case are
finite and specified in the charge or tort, this body of common-law opinions has
created a large archive that potentially can bear on any decision within the
appropriate jurisdiction. Since the 1970s, though, courts have been able to
withhold decisions from publication that they consider not weighty enough or
not so universal as to be worthy of setting precedent. So, although these
decisions may be published in some form, it is clearly signaled that they are not
of precedential value.13 This set of precedential decisions being limited to those
approved for publication limits their numbers somewhat, but this emphasizes
the importance of those so selected.
Judges have written these decisions with an increasing awareness of their
role not only in deciding the cases before them, but in directing or constraining
the actions of future courts—the development of rules or tests that lower courts
must follow as stare decisis precedent. The Daubert rule for the admissibility of
expert testimony is one such precedent issued by the Supreme Court. It figures
strongly in the litigation around PPA, to be examined below. Rules or tests are
also issued by lower courts to set terms of practice and adjudication in their
jurisdictions. The reports containing carefully written opinions form the largest
part of the extensive law library needed for effective practice and have provided
lucrative businesses for the small number of specialized publishers that provide
9. Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1197–98
(2007).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1225.
12. Id. at 1188 (“[T]he common law consists of what judges write in their opinions.” (emphasis
omitted)).
13. E.g., Folks v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., No. 05-1356, 2007 WL 2993595, at n.**
(10th Cir. Oct. 15, 2007).
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case reports and the related bibliographic tools for their access. West
Publishing’s policy of comprehensiveness and accuracy since its founding in
1876 caused it to become the primary print custodian of judicial opinions, and
its organization and pagination informed documentation practice.14 The primary
legal search tool, Shepherd’s Citations, was also keyed to the West reports.15
Standard bibliographic styles for legal publications emerged fairly recently
and are regulated primarily through The Bluebook: A Uniform System of
Citation.16 The Bluebook first appeared in 1926, replacing earlier style manuals.17
It relied on West’s organization and pagination of cases. Bluebook style moved
into court practice only in the 1970s, although with it came an almost fetishistic
obsession with citation correctness, according to a recent article by Gallacher.18
Nonetheless, some variation in judicial use remains, with some states such as
California having distinctive styles based on the local publisher of reports and
the Supreme Court continuing to go its own way.
With the advent of electronic publication and distribution, LEXIS (now
LexisNexis) entered the market and eventually was purchased by Elsevier,
which also purchased Shepherd’s Citations.19 West was purchased by Thomson
Publishing and became WESTLAW.20 In 2000, the Association of Legal Writing
Directors issued a competing system, which has gained some acceptance in law
schools though only limited acceptance in the courts.21 Despite the increasing
presence of electronic access and dissemination, both publishers (West and
LexisNexis) and both citation systems rely on the paper pagination in West,
which is the most comprehensive publisher of federal and state cases.22
In the scientific world, Elsevier, Thomson, and other large publishers made
a somewhat similar attempt to gain control over the corpus of scholarly
publication, but in that world the domains are much more open, and the task is
much more difficult. Despite Thomson’s accumulation of the core access tools
of the Web of Science (formerly the Science Citation Index) and Current

14. Robert Berring, Chaos, Cyberspace and Tradition: Legal Information Transmogrified, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189, 191–92 (1997).
15. Id. at 194–95.
16. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds.,
18th ed. 2005).
17. ERWIN GRISWOLD, A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION: ABBREVIATIONS AND FORM OF
CITATION (1st ed. 1926).
18. Ian Gallacher, Cite Unseen: How Neutral Citation and America’s Law Schools Can Cure Our
Strange Devotion to Bibliographical Orthodoxy and the Constriction of Open and Equal Access to the
Law 7–8 (Berkeley Electronic Press Legal Series, Working Paper No. 1505, 2006), available at
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1505/.
19. See Berring, supra note 14, at 198.
20. Id.
21. DARBY DICKERSON, ALWD CITATION MANUAL: A PROFESSIONAL SYSTEM OF CITATION
(1st ed. 2000). The manual is now in the third edition.
22. One scholar argues that this use of West pagination, tied to West’s aggressive legal action to
maintain copyright control over the pagination, supports monopolistic ownership and that legal practice
should adopt vendor-neutral citation practices to open up democratic access. See Gallacher, supra note
18, at 33–34.
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Contents, along with ownership of a large portfolio of major journals, it has not
accomplished monopoly control.
These issues over citation format and monopolistic control of knowledge
highlight how closely linked citation is to the form and ownership of the
intertextual corpus that constitutes relevant knowledge. Law has come to
depend on the emergence of a finite, though growing, corpus of definitive texts
of precedential cases studied in their letter as well as their spirit. Further, this
body of texts has become associated with a set of reasoning practices that read,
interpret, synthesize, and apply the precedential decisions. Particularly in the
context of stare decisis, this intertextual corpus reduces the flexibility of
common law,23 while it keeps the pool of relevant intertexts finite. What remains
of interpretation and interpretive flexibility now tends to center on legal
reasoning about the precedents, their meanings, implications, and applications.
Accordingly, the citation system facilitates reference to precise pages and
paragraphs, pointing to specific, quoted words or phrases or to principles
embodied within short, focused text passages.
C. Scientific Intertextuality and the Communal Project of Scientific Truth
Science is also a cumulative communal project, but its citation systems and
underlying intertextual practices are substantially different, coming from a
different history of citation that really started only in the latter half of the
eighteenth century. Before that, regularized citation was left largely to the
humanist scholars and historians who had a finite corpus of well-organized- and
scrutinized classic texts and chronicles, with multiple editions and copies to sort
out. Although earlier books of natural philosophy did refer to one another,
there was little regularized expectation of familiarity with the prior literature,
let alone any expectation of citing it, summarizing it, and positioning one’s work
within it. An ideology of natural philosophy as a communal enterprise with
communal procedures for inscription and aggregation was earlier associated
with Sir Francis Bacon’s vision of Salomon’s House in the New Atlantis.24 This
ideology was invoked in the formation of practices of communal witnessing and
attesting to observed phenomena in the Royal Society and similar natural
philosophic societies.25 Nonetheless, publications presented work largely as
individual discovery, coming from the insight, observational acuity, and
methodological cleverness of the individual investigator.
23. See Tiersma, supra note 9, at 1205–06 (describing how precedent continues to bind English
courts).
24. See generally SIR FRANCIS BACON, THE NEW ATLANTIS (1626) (describing a mythical
enlightened land and its institutions of knowledge).
25. See generally DWIGHT ATKINSON, SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE IN SOCIOHISTORICAL CONTEXT
(Charles Bazerman ed., 1999) (analyzing the relation been linguistic forms and social factors in the
emergence of scientific argument); BAZERMAN, SHAPING WRITTEN KNOWLEDGE, supra note 4; ALAN
G. GROSS, JOSEPH E. HARMON & MICHAEL REIDY, COMMUNICATING SCIENCE (2002) (comparing
the development of scientific writing in England, France and Germany); STEVEN SHAPIN & SIMON
SCHAFFER, LEVIATHAN AND THE AIR-PUMP: HOBBES, BOYLE AND THE EXPERIMENTAL LIFE (1985)
(examining the social and ideological origins of scientific argument in seventeenth century England).
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The emergence of natural philosophic journals starting in 166526 created
more opportunity for exchange that included overt reference to the work and
statements of others. Such exchange most frequently arose in the context of
explicit controversy and contestation, as in the exchange over Newton’s new
theory of light and colors in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society,
beginning in 1672 and comprising eighteen published exchanges.27 However, the
initiating article was told as an individual narrative and set of assertions.28 After
the exchange of argument and counterargument, Newton withdrew from the
hand-to-hand combat of journal publication. He published his Opticks29 three
decades later as a self-contained logical system with no citation of the opposing
views nor of prior relevant work. In fact, an investigation of all of the
Philosophical Transactions reveals that a semblance of modern citation practice
emerged only at the beginning of the nineteenth century.30
One of the pioneers of modern citation practice and literature review was
Joseph Priestley, best known for his work as a chemist, but who carried a broad
enlightenment portfolio from theology, philosophy, and language to history and
politics, as well as the sciences. In History and Present State of Electricity, he
argued for taking into account the collected experience of humankind as
recorded in all scientific works.31 An empirically grounded natural philosophy,
he argued, needed a comprehensive review of all prior experiences and
experiments, as well as a history of theories, apparatuses, and investigative
procedures.32 This shared attention to the collective literature, Priestley
believed, would not only aggregate experience, but would build common
understanding, moving science from contestation to communal cooperation and
shared, explicit, public reasoning about investigation, finding, and theories.33
While competitive individuality and contestation remain major mechanisms of
science, they have become embedded within the collective frame of the
communal record of data and reasoning embodied in the literature. Each new
contribution must locate itself within and contribute to the literature, while
distinguishing itself by defining its unique contribution to the collective
enterprise.
The specific citation practices for the various disciplines that became labeled
science in the nineteenth century varied from each other somewhat and were
gradually codified in this past century in a number of different styles regulated

26. The first issue of the French Journal des Sçavans is dated January 5, 1665 and the first issue of
the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society is dated March 6, 1665.
27. BAZERMAN, SHAPING WRITTEN KNOWLEDGE, supra note 4, at 100.
28. Id. at 87–99.
29. SIR ISAAC NEWTON, OPTICKS: OR, A TREATISE OF THE REFLECTIONS, REFRACTIONS,
INFLECTIONS & COLOURS OF LIGHT (1704).
30. BAZERMAN, SHAPING WRITTEN KNOWLEDGE, supra note 4, at 78–79.
31. JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, HISTORY AND PRESENT STATE OF ELECTRICITY, Vol. 1, at xviii (1767).
32. Charles Bazerman, How Natural Philosophers Can Cooperate, in TEXTUAL DYNAMICS OF THE
PROFESSIONS 13, 16–17 (Charles Bazerman & James Paradis eds., 1991).
33. Id. at 37–39.
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through manuals and specified by disciplinary journals. Some styles are
enforced discipline-wide as part of a definition of scientific quality, particularly
when the most influential journals are owned by the professional society that
also publishes the manual, as with the American Psychological Association.34 In
other disciplines, journals vary in their preferred styles. But all of the styles are
built around and enforced by articles appearing in those journals, with primary
locators being the journal title, volume or date, and pagination, and the
publication identifiers being author and title. The differences have to do with
punctuation, use of abbreviations, placement of the date, and, perhaps most
significantly, how the citation is tagged to the body of the text. A citation can be
tagged as an obscure footnote reference number or as a parenthetical reminder
of author and date, whether in a format that facilitates quotation and specific
page reference or in a format that facilitates treating the cited text as a single
unit. Every variation from the conventionally anticipated information (easily
represented within the standard format) requires extra work and an unusual
citation form. The disciplinary variations in format generally have arisen from
the nature of the materials used in the discipline, from the way they enter into
the discussion, and from the ultimate goals of the work—whether clinical,
applied, or theoretical. Citation styles and bibliographic tools also embody ideas
about how knowledge accumulates and interacts to form a collective body of
disciplinary knowledge.35
Whichever style is employed, the intertext is treated as fluid and
progressive, with new knowledge constantly being sought to replace the old,
and citation lists being biased towards more-recent publications defining a
research front, against which the new article defines its contribution. Each
citation, therefore, has a half-life, either deteriorating into obscurity or
becoming such a standard part of knowledge that it no longer requires citation.36
The knowledge of fields is codified through this sorting process of citation and
incorporation into the body of disciplinary knowledge.37 But this is a rolling
codification, in which new claims and theories replace old ones. Through novel
investigation by new researchers, the literature constantly reaches out into new
phenomena, new forms of data, new theories, and more fundamental
explanations. It does not remain fixed, nor does it seek finality and fixity. If it
achieves these things, it is no longer a research field, but a fixed body of

34. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, PUBLICATION MANUAL OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION (5th ed. 2001).
35. See generally Charles Bazerman, Codifying the Social Scientific Style: The APA Publication
Manual as Behaviorist Rhetoric, in THE RHETORIC OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 125 (John S. Nelson,
Allan Megill & Donald N. McCloskey eds., 1987).
36. Derek J. de Solla Price, Citation measures of hard science, soft science, technology, and
nonscience, in COMMUNICATION AMONG SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS 3, 9 (C.E. Nelson & D.K.
Pollack eds., 1970).
37. ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
INVESTIGATIONS 516 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973).
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knowledge ready for commodification, without need of a supporting
profession.38
The ultimate judgment as to which investigations, findings, and publications
will stand over time as credible and usable is not up to any individual or panel.
Instead, the judgment is made in the aggregate, communal determination of
what is useful and cited, as each scientist builds new work on the basis of what
came before. Results mount up in the literature, and carry force. If a case is
uncertain or if reasoning and evidence are insufficient, one does not take strong
stands on the prior work, but rather modulates, proposes alternatives, or seeks
more evidence through new methods. The need to build on what is credible and
reliable inflects usability judgments, leading colleagues to evaluate the quality
of related work. But scientists also evaluate the importance of others’ findings
to their own work, and therefore the patterns of citation also sort out what is
most important in the collective enterprise from what is irrelevant, trivial, or
just uninteresting. In most cases there is little reason to rule negatively on any
publication that is faulty, obvious, or unenlightening because, in most cases, it
will simply fade into uncited obscurity. Citation studies regularly show there are
few negative citations, and many articles are rarely or never cited. Most articles
are more likely to be ignored than criticized.
In this process of selective citation, the literature gets organized around
focused findings associated with particular articles. The findings or meaning of
each article tends to get compacted into a single concept, and citations become
concept symbols.39 After a perhaps brief period of uncertain meaning, there is
less focus on particular wording than on the abstracted finding.40 The article has
come to be seen as supporting the finding, and the exact words are at stake only
rarely, when the validity of the claim is being contested. As a result, citations
have migrated in the direction of holistic citations to entire articles, and formats
are less convenient for specific page and quotation identification.
In scientific publication, the practice closest to legal admissibility is the
refereeing process, which allows a finding to enter into the literature, but which
transforms it by the pressures of the reviewing process to meet the criteria of
the referees.41 Nonetheless, the relevance of a published article then is up to
each new researcher who selects and repurposes articles from the literature.
Within this communal project of scientific inquiry, publication, and
codification of the intertext, there is no fixed time frame within which any
problem must be solved or any account must be settled, unlike each judicial
proceeding, in which the case must be decided. Although, in science, various
practical concerns might place an exigency on finding a solution—for example,
on treating an epidemic disease or on producing results that might warrant
38. ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS 146–47 (1988).
39. Henry G. Small, Cited Documents as Concept Symbols, 8 SOC. STUD. SCI. 327, 328 (1978).
40. See generally Susan E. Cozzens, Comparing the Sciences: Citation Context Analysis of Papers
from Neuropharmacology and the Sociology of Science, 15 SOC. STUD. SCI. 127 (1985).
41. GREG MYERS, WRITING BIOLOGY 63–100 (1990).
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continuation of a grant—there is no absolute institutional time exigency on any
matter. Additionally, in the course of investigation, a researcher might find
something she was not looking for, transform one research question into
another, narrow or broaden her focus, or otherwise get sidetracked from the
initial task. In fact, such evolution of attention and effort is the expectation in
most investigations as one finds out about one’s subject.
Whereas law is constituted and regulated in each jurisdiction, with supreme
authority currently located in the nation or state, science is international,
although its practice might be regulated, sponsored, or used within each
jurisdiction. So, while science in each state might be responsive to and
dependent on political, social, economic, and legal conditions, science as a
whole is a separate system, unregulated except by its internal dynamic. The
work of science may migrate to any hospitable state, and the findings can
migrate across borders (except when the findings are created under conditions
of state secrecy). So, again, it is the collective judgment of working scientists
that evaluates what constitutes valid and significant work.
D. The Meeting of the Legal and Scientific Documentary Systems
Both legal and scientific systems are intended to inscribe significant parts of
the world, but in ways that are not necessarily congruent. One system, law,
judges human actions and intentions in order to regulate behavior and to sort
out punishments, liabilities, and transfers, and so to maintain an appearance
and substance of justice that facilitates citizen adherence to the regulated order.
The other system, science, attempts to come to truths about the physical,
biological, and social worlds, but without passing judgment or ascribing
punishment or reward (although these may appear as secondary consequences).
Nonetheless, science and law often meet. As science is carried out within
one political jurisdiction or another, its practitioners are attentive to the
regulations, needs, and opportunities of that jurisdiction. For example, scientists
are at times the litigants in judicial cases, either as plaintiffs suing for rights or
for resources to practice science or as defendants whose scientific practice is
being regulated.42 Many of the expert witnesses or scientists whose published
work is used in cases are employed by state agencies or in institutions that
receive state support and are responsive to state mandates.43 The key study in In
re Phenylpropanolamine Products Liability Litigation,44 the Yale Hemorrhagic
Stroke Project (HSP),45 for example, was at the intersection of complex public,
private, and corporate interests, since it was carried out by the FDA in

42. These issues are not discussed here, although it is obvious that the research on PPA was
focused and shaped by the jurisdiction in which science was practiced—the regulated medical and
pharmaceutical practice within the United States.
43. See, e.g., William N. Kernan et al., Phenylpropanolamine and the Risk of Hemorrhagic Stroke,
343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1826 (2000).
44. In re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1230 (W.D. Wash, 2003).
45. Kernan et al., supra note 43.
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collaboration with authors employed at both public and private universities,
using data from public and private hospitals, and funded by highly regulated
pharmaceutical corporations.46
The focus here is rather on the court’s need for science in making its
judgments. How do courts admit scientific knowledge? What weight does
scientific literature carry in the legal system? And how is science used in
deliberating judgments once it appears in court? In particular, this article looks
at two related documents that still have authoritative presence in medical
science and in court: the published study of the Yale Hemorrhagic Stroke
Project47 and Judge Rothstein’s opinion on the Daubert hearing in
Phenylpropanolamine Products.48 This opinion admits expert testimony on the
strength of the HSP study, published in The New England Journal of Medicine
(NEJM). Both the HSP study and the opinion are considered here in the
context of prior texts on the science and litigation of PPA. And although both
have authoritative presence concerning PPA and some special characteristics
related to that authority, they share many characteristics with texts of a period
before the issues came to be sorted out into authoritative views.
III
EXPERT TESTIMONY AS THE ENTRY POINT OF SCIENCE INTO THE COURTS
In all the many PPA court cases, scientific literature and scientific opinion
are filtered through the testimony of expert witnesses. That is, individuals
testify, and it is they—not the science—who are being measured for their
credibility, just as any other witness would be. But an expert witness’s authority
to speak comes from his expertise, which allows him to comment on and
evaluate the state of knowledge and the particular medical records of a case.
Accordingly, the scientific literature and other documentary records (other than
those reporting directly on matters in the case) are not direct evidence in the
case, in the way a bank robber’s note to the teller or a surveillance-camera
photo would be; instead, the scientific foundation serves only to authenticate
the expert’s expertise and opinion. The scientific literature is neither read
directly nor taken as a whole by the fact finder. Its general weight is not
evaluated. Nor is the relative weight and meaning of each constituent part—nor
its contributory role to a larger conclusion—considered. Scientific conclusions
are not drawn through scientific reasoning, nor are they used in pursuit of
further inquiries. Rather, the scientific literature comes filtered, shaped, and
accountable through the individual expert witness, who must be taken as
speaking authoritatively even to be permitted to be heard.
The aspect of the testimony subject to judicial opinion is its admissibility—
whether the expert witness may testify or whether the expert’s deposition can

46. Id. at 1826, 1832.
47. Id.
48. Phenylpropanolamine Prods., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1230.
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be entered into the court record as evidence. The deposition process, in fact,
allows the judge to evaluate beforehand the testimony of the expert witness to
see whether it meets the criteria for admissibility. Of course, all evidence, even
a bank robber’s note, is subject to rules and challenges about admissibility. If
they are judged as admissible, these documents can stand as evidence. In the
case of expert witnesses, however, it is only their opinions or testimony that
carries evidentiary weight, with the underlying scientific literature merely
supporting admissibility and credibility.
A complete study of the ways the scientific literature is used to establish
admissibility and credibility would require a full examination of all the legal
filings, depositions, briefs, and courtroom arguments on both sides. However,
this article is limited to judicial rulings and opinions on admissibility and weight
once admitted. These judicial opinions, reflecting a judge’s evaluation of all the
issues and evidence presented, constitute the residue of legal reasoning, which
forms the primary record and statement of the meaning of the case after its
conclusion.
The court establishes standards to regularize what is admissible as expert
testimony. The federal rules of evidence presuppose two distinct kinds of
witness. The lay witness is important strictly for what he has observed, not what
he thinks or knows beyond the case, and the main evaluation of the testimony is
of the trustworthiness of the witness’s character and observational skills. Expert
witnesses, on the other hand, likely will not have specific personal knowledge of
the case at hand. Typically, they learn the particulars of the case only through
records or through examining artifacts. The judgments they make may rely on
evidence beyond what might be admissible. Their expertise grants them broader
license for their opinions than that given lay witnesses, even to the point of
permitting their direct opinions on the issue being judged in the case.49 In short,
expert witnesses do not necessarily have any direct observations to report but
are valued for their opinions, not, like lay witnesses, for their personal
trustworthiness, but for their expertise. Their testimony can be impeached only
by attacking that expertise or, more precisely, its relevance and use in the case
at hand. Thus, it is not uncommon in cases ruling on the admissibility of
testimony for the judge to offer effusive praise for the credentials, reputation,
and competence of the expert witness while ruling her testimony inadmissible.
The question of admissibility of expert testimony in the United States goes
back at least as far as the 1923 case Frye v. United States, which resulted in a
broad test of general acceptance within any one relevant scientific community.50
Since 1993, the Supreme Court decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,51 has been the ruling law. It reaffirms the role of the judge

49. Except their opinion concerning criminal insanity. See FED. R. EVID. 704(b).
50. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
51. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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as the gatekeeper of scientific-expert testimony as expressed in the Federal
Rule of Evidence 702, which reads,
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
52
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

The Daubert decision explicitly recognizes the judicial procedures as being
different from evaluative procedures in science. The judicial gatekeeping has to
do with the relevancy and usefulness to trying the matter at hand, rather than
the long-term production of scientific truth.
Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must
resolve disputes finally and quickly. The scientific project is advanced by broad and
wide-ranging consideration of a multitude of hypotheses, for those that are incorrect
53
will eventually be shown to be so, and that in itself is an advance.

Despite its recognition of these evaluative differences, the Court held that
the trial judge needed to rule on whether the testimony was grounded in
science, which would include an evaluation of both scientific knowledge and
method.54 The Court identified four criteria for determining whether expert
testimony is valid scientific knowledge: first, “whether [the theory or technique]
can be (and has been) tested”; second, “whether the theory or technique has
been subjected to peer review and publication”; third, “the known or potential
rate of error”; and, fourth, the “identification of a relevant scientific community
and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that
community.”55 The court further instructed that judicial inquiry should be
limited to “principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they
generate.”56
Insofar as the court’s logic suggests criteria different from that practiced in
the expert’s field, there is the potential for tension over the value of the expert’s
findings. Since Daubert, there has been controversy over the reasonableness of
these criteria and whether they are based on an appropriate understanding of
science.57 There also has been controversy on how strictly and comprehensively
these criteria should be applied and whether all need be met. Further, there is
unease in the way scientific knowledge gets played out within an adversarial
court system in which each side tries to establish its witnesses as more expert
and to undermine the expertise of the other side—that is, whose knowledge

52. FED. R. EVID. 702.
53. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
54. Id. at 592–93.
55. Id. at 593–94.
56. Id. at 594.
57. See, e.g., 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (SUPPLEMENT 1) S1 (2005). The entire special issue is
devoted to the implications of Daubert.
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(and method upon which such knowledge rests) will stand as fact within the
court records.58
Despite the controversies over the Daubert rules or the particulars in each
case, once a court has ruled those criteria as having been met by testimony, the
science is “authoritative” from the court’s perspective, obviating the need for
any finer judgments.
IV
THE CASE OF PPA LITIGATION
A number of PPA cases have been litigated in the post-Daubert period.
They concern whether hemorrhagic strokes or other medical conditions were
caused by PPA, a common ingredient in appetite suppressant and in cough and
cold products from the 1970s until recently. In November 2000, the FDA
recommended a voluntary withdrawal of products containing PPA;
subsequently it started procedures to outlaw over-the-counter sales of these
products. As of February 22, 2007, LexisNexis listed one U.S. Supreme Court
ruling, eighteen federal courts of appeals rulings, and ninety-four federaldistrict-court rulings relating to PPA.59 State cases are many times that number.60
Most of the federal rulings represent distinct cases, but twenty-nine ruled on the
multiparty, multidistrict case In re Phenylpropanolamine.61
Some of the cases occurred before work was completed on an
epidemiological HSP study that came to be treated as authoritative by scientists,
regulators, courts, and pharmacological companies alike. This study was first
issued as a report on May 10, 2000, then published in the NEJM.62 Once this
study became accepted as adequate epidemiological evidence to be admitted
and upheld in major rulings, it dampened the controversy and made moot some
of the complex handling of expert testimony in earlier cases. This article
examines the study as an example of scientific patterns of intertextuality and
then considers the ruling that accepted the study as the basis of authoritative
opinion.
A. Intertextuality in the NEJM Paper
The NEJM paper is typical of scientific papers in its intertextuality, and it
indeed cites much of the prior literature on the issue of the kind and substance

58. Even further, commercial interests brought into court may suppress scientific findings or
otherwise intervene in scientific debate for commercial advantage, as was reported to have occurred in
the case of PPA. Kevin Sack & Alicia Mundy, Over-the-Counter Peril, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2004, at
A1.
59. LexisNexis online search under “Phenylpropanolamine,” Feb. 22, 2007.
60. Id.
61. In re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1230 (W.D. Wash. 2003).
62. Kernan, supra note 43, at 1826.
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that would have been available in the previous court cases.63 The most overt sign
of intertextuality is the explicit citation, but it is worthwhile considering as well
some implicit intertextual references and reliances. The citation system in
NEJM uses superscript numbers keyed to a references list presented in the
sequential order they first appear in the article. It is a kind of hybrid of “works
cited” with footnote systems. Though the sequential numbering system is far
from universal in the sciences, the substance of the information presented
within the citation, as well as the punctuation, are common. The citation system
in NEJM allows efficient repetition of the citations, but is more cumbersome
than most science-citation systems for specific page references because the
citation list includes only inclusive pagination, and the superscript numbers do
not provide an easy place for exact page references. Further, using superscript
numbers as text anchors (rather than parenthetical author names or other
recognizable text identifiers) suppresses author identification in the text as well
as specific discussion of the article. It does not easily facilitate identification of
quotations. Instead, it treats references as background in the literature, to be
taken as underlying support but not to be actively discussed.
This system presents the HSP investigation reported on in the article in an
unencumbered foreground even more than most systems. Indeed, in several
places citations are presented en masse, to demonstrate the weight of the
literature rather than indexing a specific determinative finding or identifying a
finding to be discussed in detail. Thus the first cited claim aggregates nine
citations, which then embeds even more reports: “Since 1979, more than 30 case
reports have been published that describe the occurrence of intracranial
hemorrhage after ingestion of phenylpropanolamine.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9”64 The next
sentence repeats three citations and adds four more, to make a further
specifying claim about documented cases: “Affected patients were most
commonly adolescent girls or young women between the ages of 17 and 45
years who were using phenylpropanolamine-containing appetite suppressants,
often for the first time.7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13”65 The characterization of these articles as case
reports identifies the level of data they provide, and allows them to be taken as
a kind of anecdotal evidence of a possible association, significant in their
accumulation as indicating something worth investigating further and more
systematically, but not yet establishing any relation. Other, even less-formal
evidence is then cited from medical reports filed with the FDA, but not rising to
the level of peer-reviewed scientific publication. For example, “In addition to
the published reports, between 1969 and 1991, the Food and Drug

63. The original HSP study, issued eight months earlier, is similar in structure and citation patterns
to the published article, and therefore this analysis with minor modifications would hold for that one as
well. Accord RALPH I. HORWITZ, LAWRENCE M. BRASS, WALTER N. KERNAN, & CATHERINE M.
VISCOLI, PHENYLPROPANOLAMINE AND RISK OF HEMORRHAGIC STROKE: FINAL REPORT OF THE
HEMORRHAGIC STROKE PROJECT (2000), available at www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/00/backgrd/3
647b1_tab19.doc.
64. Kernan, supra note 43, at 1826.
65. Id.
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Administration (FDA) received 22 spontaneous reports of hemorrhagic stroke
associated with phenylpropanolamine in appetite suppressants (16 cases) or
cough and cold remedies (6 cases) (Jolson HM: personal communication).”66
These case reports constitute the entire review of the literature. They also
constitute well over half of the cited papers (thirteen of twenty-three, plus the
FDA spontaneous reports not in the numbered reference list). No biology,
chemistry, medical analysis, public health, or other literature is overtly
referenced, though the existence of that literature is implicit within the
definitions and uses of PPA presented in the opening sentences:
“Phenylpropanolamine is a synthetic sympathomimetic amine commonly found
in appetite suppressants and cough and cold remedies. Each month, millions of
Americans use products containing phenylpropanolamine.”67 The general
chemical, pharmacological, and public-health backgrounds, along with the
specific case reports, establish the research space and problem for the current
investigation, typical of the “create a research space” model found across
contemporary sciences.68 Although the general problem comes from
pharmacology, medicine, and public health, the immediately relevant
literature—the research-space framework, actively invoked to define the
current limits and knowledge and a gap to be filled by the study—is anecdotal
case reports. Their use indicates a potential problem. Implicitly, according to
the standards of the field, such a concern would call for a randomly sampled,
large-scale epidemiological study. The current article then aims to fill this gap:
“In response to the concern raised by these case reports, in 1992 we
collaborated with the FDA and manufacturers of phenylpropanolamine to
design the Hemorrhagic Stroke Project, a case-control study . . . .”69
The methods section, for the most part, does not explicitly refer to other
literature, though the standards of the field embodied in the cumulative
literature are implicit throughout in the identification of the studied population,
in the manner of data collection, and in the statistical analyses applied. As is
standard practice for statistical analysis, specific named tests and procedures are
applied, each of which has an embedded literature. Some of the procedure
names were in fact eponymic (Fisher’s test, O’Brien-Fleming spending
function).70 Specific computer programs and commercial software suppliers used
for the analysis are mentioned as well,71 to verify the standardness of procedures
and to allow reexamination of the data and analysis. Moreover, the tools of
investigation are themselves congealed literature, embodying principles from
the literature used in their design.72 Although scientific articles do sometimes
66.
67.
68.
(1990).
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
JOHN M. SWALES, GENRE ANALYSIS: ENGLISH IN ACADEMIC AND RESEARCH SETTINGS 140
Kernan, supra note 43, at 1826.
MERTON, supra note 37, at 298–302.
Kernan, supra note 43, at 1827.
BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE 66 (1979).

06_BAZERMAN__CONTRACT PROOF_.DOC

Winter 2009]

4/2/2009 11:13:09 AM

HOW DOES SCIENCE COME TO SPEAK IN THE COURTS?

109

cite methodological literature—particularly if something is novel, unusual, or in
question—here, in the paper’s methods section, procedures are treated as
largely standard, except for the particular difficulties of the study, which are
treated as local adaptations of general principles. Also, the critical procedures
referred to in such a section would be read by a professional audience,73 who
would confirm the procedures’ conformity with standard practice in the
literature of the field. One rhetorical function of such sections is to confirm that
this work was done as any competent scientist in the field would do it, and
therefore the results should not be questioned. Clear conformity to the
literature avoids raising any red flags regarding methodology and is thus a
useful strategy for gaining acceptance. The primary exception to the
implicitness of the literature in the methods section is the citation of three
articles pointing to specific findings that help identify procedures for data
collection and analysis.
Some patients with subarachnoid or intercerebral hemorrhage may have a transient
headache hours or days before the onset of symptoms that lead them to seek medical
14, 15
The cause of these sentinal headaches is not known, although clinicians
attention.
16
infer that some may be due to minor bleeding. Accordingly, for patients with such
headaches we defined a modified focal time as the time of onset of the sentinal
74
headache. We used this definition in secondary analysis.

Two standard reference works were also cited to confirm the formulation of
the products patients reported as using. In certain cases, when questions had
arisen of product change or generic or store brand, the authors had crosschecked with manufacturers, making manufacturers’ records also part of the
implicit intertext.
There is another kind of intertextuality in the use of hospital and interview
records as data for the study, including many reported compromises made to
address the contingencies of the study, with explanations and rationales as to
why these should be allowed without compromising the integrity of the study.75
The authors of the NEJM article work hard to argue that the available records
meet the standard of epidemiological method despite a number of specific
shortcomings and compromises. The data tables aggregate these inscribed data
and are intertextually dependent on them, as are the discussion and conclusions
about health risks. One method of questioning the claims of the article would
be to examine the records and interview data in order to seek irregularities
within them, the way they are aggregated in the article, or their reliability as
epidemiological data.
In the discussion portion of the paper, citations of a prior epidemiological
study and previously cited case reports are presented as agreeing with the study.
But they do not live up to the accomplishment boasted: “Our study establishes
strong epidemiological evidence of the association . . . .”76 This is the desired
73.
74.
75.
76.

BAZERMAN, supra note 4, at 260.
Kernan, supra note 43, at 1827.
Id. at 1828.
Id. at 1831.
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speech act the article aims to accomplish—the illocutionary force, as Austin
would call it.77 But of course, as Austin would also point out, the success of the
speech act would depend on the uptake of the readers, that is, how the readers
would use their understanding of the text in consequent actions, what he would
call the perlocutionary effect.78 To forestall objections readers might have that
might undermine their understanding of the claim as a speech act, three more
citations recognize potential limits of the study based on potential biases
established in the literature.79 But each of these potentially undermining
citations is met with a methodological rejoinder explaining how each potential
bias was controlled for in this case.80 A final citation is used to calculate
potential overall impact if carried across the entire population.81
Overall, this article draws widely and complexly on a multidimensional
research and methodological literature, some evoked implicitly and other,
specific items brought explicitly to the citational foreground in order to frame
the importance, meaning, and value of the current study and its findings.
However, none of this literature is quoted, examined in detail, or interpreted as
to the exact meaning, limitations, or implications of its precise wording. In using
this literature, the authors distinguish between that which is widely known and
accepted and that which is contested, uncertain, and at stake. The widely
accepted is typically taken as common knowledge, a given, or as guidance for
pursuing the investigation in ways that will be credible, meeting the
expectations of good work. Widely accepted work thus establishes criteria for
the acceptance of new work, thereby helping establish conditions that must be
met in order for the new work to accomplish successfully the desired act
associated with the genre. Such epidemiological studies and the articles
reporting them aim at establishing an association between a condition (medical,
pharmacological, environmental, et cetera), and a health result within a
substantially sized, defined population. To do so, an epidemiological study must
match multiple expectations of what constitutes a valid piece of work; such
expectations have developed over the history of contention in the literature of
what findings could be taken as valid. Nonetheless, findings of a lesser sort,
which do not match the standards to which the NEJM article aspires or which
attempt to accomplish something different, are cited and used as positive
indicators of a problem to be investigated, or as a clarifying constraint directing
analytical procedures, or confirmation of the study. Further shortcomings of the
sample, data, and analysis are also recognized and explained. Thus, the article
depends on a complex weighing and argumentative synthesis of many pieces,
leading to an overall evaluation of the weight of the evidence. In the long run,
whether the speech act stands and the claimed association is taken to be true,

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 121–22.
Id.
See Kernan, supra note 43, at 1831.
See id.
See id.
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acted upon, and accepted as the basis for further studies that reconfirm and
extend its truth, depend on the readers’ uptake in their future actions.
If there were no urgent health, regulatory, commercial production, or legal
consequences of the article’s findings, there would be no exigency for a reading
audience to make an immediate, definitive judgment on its content. Rather, the
study would go into the mill of ongoing science to see whether it would be
accepted as reliable and useful to future researchers. That usefulness and
reliability would establish the facticity or solidity of the result, leading to its
codification within the canon of knowledge. The exigency of legal proceedings,
reflecting urgent human stakes, however, puts new pressures on the gradual
judgments of science and pushes for judgment even when scientific judgment is
not yet final.
B. Science in the Daubert Consideration of In re Phenylpropanolamine
Legal cases concerning PPA before and after the Yale study vary in the
extent to which they pay attention to the scientific literature. Most are
concerned entirely with legal matters and do not cite or mention the scientific
literature. 82 Typically, the matters being ruled on involve only legal questions
and not the substance or admissibility of expert testimony. Even when
considering issues surrounding expert witnesses, the discussion may be entirely
legal. However, when it concerns admissibility, the discussion may briefly
include the science, though within a predominantly legal context, framed by the
Daubert criteria.83 In a rare case, the judge undertakes a detailed scrutiny of
specific procedures, analyses, and practices that stand behind the opinions of
the expert witnesses. Most notably, in a lengthy opinion in Soldo v. Sandoz, the
defendants were granted summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff’s
expert testimony was inadmissible.84 The ruling was based on a detailed critique
of the methods and practices of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses respecting
specific facts and opinions they had reported.85 In effect, the judge was ruling on
specific “scientific facts” that would have been relied on in the plaintiff’s case.86
In the multidistrict litigation In re Phenylpropanolamine, the Yale study was
accepted as authoritative science and as the basis of admissible expert opinion.87
In its Daubert hearing, the lawyers for the several plaintiffs offered the
testimony of fourteen expert witnesses, all advancing the theory of the Yale

82. See, e.g., Love v. Wyeth, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (N.D. Ala. 2008); Kobar ex rel. Kobar, 378 F.
Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Ariz. 2005).
83. See, e.g., Globetti v. Sandoz Pharms., Corp., 111 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (considering
whether expert testimony on the causation of myocardial infarction satisfied the Daubert requirements
of scientific methodology and evidentiary reliability).
84. Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434, 577 (W.D. Pa. 2003).
85. Id.
86. Almost three-fourths of the Soldo opinion consists of findings of fact. See id.
87. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1239–40 (W.D. Wash.
2003) (reviewing the qualifications of the Yale study as basis for expert testimony).
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study and relying on that study as evidence.88 Defendants moved to have this
expert testimony excluded. They particularly called into question the experts’
reliance on the Yale study, which their attorneys claimed was unreliable in
some respects.89 In this hearing, testimony on several items not covered in the
Yale study was also ruled on—some ruled admissible, some inadmissible.90 The
comparison of how these issues were handled provides insight into the ways in
which scientific literature enters into judicial reasoning.
In the In re Phenylpropanolamine opinion, the judge first reviews the history
of the use of PPA in pharmaceuticals and in associated reports of hemorrhagic
strokes.91 This history is told as uncontested factual background in an absolute
narrative, without citation or contestation, referring to many documents,
published and unpublished, including “thirty published case reports”
(apparently taken uncited from the language of the NEJM article on the Yale
study).92 Governmental groups and actions are mentioned and their rules
actually quoted, but with no specific, standard citations to anchor the events
and quotations, or to make them accessible to others.93 Similarly, studies are
mentioned by the name of the primary author, such as the published “Jick
Study”94 and the unpublished “O’Neill and Van de Carr study”95 and “Dr.
Jolson’s SRS study”96 of the FDA database of spontaneous reports—but again
without formal citation or a convenient way to locate the texts. This background
ends with an extensive discussion of the history, methods, and findings of the
Yale study, mentioning the final report—but not providing a citation—and then
reporting the FDA request for voluntary withdrawal of the product, again
without specific documentation.97 This is all presented as history stipulated by
the court, an official narrative of the facts, not needing specific anchoring in the
actual documents.
The only document actually cited in this section is at the end of this
narrative, the NEJM study itself.98 The citation is presented as part of a
historical event bearing on the admissibility of the expert testimony—in
particular, in relation to the Daubert criteria of peer review and publication.
That is, the fact of publication is used as evidence of the expertise of the
witnesses, not as a way of engaging the substance of the scientific intertext.
88. Id. at 1236.
89. Id. at 1245–46.
90. See, e.g., id. at 1251 (finding certain testimony on the relationship between PPA and cardiac
injuries inadmissible for lack of evidentiary support).
91. Id. at 1234.
92. Id. at 1235.
93. E.g., id. at 1234 (“In 1976, an FDA advisory review panel recommended . . . .”).
94. Id. at 1241.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1235.
97. Id. at 1236.
98. Id. (“In December 2000, The New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) published the HSP
results in a lead article. See Walter N. Kernan et al., Phenylpropanolamine and the Risk of Hemorrhagic
Stroke, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1826 (2000) [hereinafter NEJM Article]”).
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C. Legal Reasoning About Meeting the Daubert Standard
After this background narrative, the judge begins the discussion with four
pages of the Daubert standard and related cases, with detailed legal citations,
including page or paragraph references to the Federal Rules of Evidence and
several cases, including Kennedy v. Collagen Corp, Kumho Tire Co. v
Carmichael, General Electric Co. v. Joiner, Domingo v. T.K., and two opinions
in Daubert.99 This detailed analysis of the legal precedents includes quotations
from rules and judgments, which are then interpreted as to limits, applications,
and implications.100 The analysis proceeds through legal reasoning to determine
what the Daubert standard is and how it is to be applied.101 This is a discussion of
legal rules, reasoned through legal documents. The precise reading is made
explicit so that litigants can satisfy themselves about what these documents say,
or can contest the interpretation in a further appeal. The judge notes, in
particular, that epidemiological studies are already held in legal literature as
well received by courts in mass tort cases, stating “well-conducted studies are
uniformly admitted.”102
In the next section, entitled “Defendants’ Daubert Challenges,” the judge
considers challenges to documents underlying the study.103 These preliminary
rulings refer to the defendants’ claim that evidence of causation for medical
events occurring more than three days after ingestion of PPA was insufficient.104
Because none of the cases in the litigation went outside the three-day window,
and because the plaintiffs offered no further argument or evidence on this, the
judge excludes opinions on injuries outside the three-day window as
unreliable.105 This section is under a page in length.
The most substantive and complex discussion, which is at the heart of the
defendants’ claims, involves causation of “Hemorrhagic Stroke in Women
Between the Ages of Eighteen and Forty-nine.”106 This is the lengthiest section
of the article, encompassing six pages.107 In it, many court opinions are cited
formally and in detail as part of the legal reasoning.108 It includes as well some
citations to other kinds of documents. Some of these cite specifically to legal
handbooks on the use of scientific evidence in courts in order to establish
standard legal procedure, such as Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and
Science of Expert Testimony,109 and the Federal Judicial Center’s Reference

99. In re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d. at 1236–38.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1238.
103. Id. The judge had already ruled on two documents that had been specifically cited.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1238–44.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1239 (citing DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (1997 ed.)).
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Manual on Scientific Evidence.110 The opinion includes quotations from both the
FDA study and the NEJM article to show the methodological caution they
exhibit, so as to meet objections based on their “flaws” and to handle those
objections as advised in the legal canon.111 The quotations are not for scientific
interpretation but only to demonstrate that the studies correspond with the
Daubert standard. One footnote indicates textbooks cited by the expert
witnesses to show the general acceptance of the PPA causation theory.112 The
textbook and treatise citations are evidence of widespread scientific acceptance,
specifically of PPA as a risk factor for strokes, which enhances the reliability of
the plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions and which is mentioned in Daubert as a
potential factor in admissibility.113
D. Defense Challenges to the Science and the Court’s Reasoning About the
Scientific Literature
At this point in the ruling, however, in responding to specific challenges to
the scientific status of the findings relied on by the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses,
as well as to their conclusions, the judge’s handling of the scientific literature
changes. First, the judge cites an article invoked by the defense that appeared
after the NEJM publication of the Yale study:
During the final day of the Daubert proceedings, defendants raised challenges relating
to a new article by the HSP investigators to be published in the June 2003 issue of the
journal “Stroke.” See Joseph P. Broderick et al., Major Risk Factors for Aneurysmal
Subarachnoid Hemorrhage in the Young are Modifiable, (Stroke, 2003) (hereinafter
“Stroke Article”). Defendants assert that this article demonstrates the lack of
association between PPA and SAHs resulting from the rupturing of an aneurysm
(“aneurysmal SAH”). The court finds that the defendants distort and misinterpret the
114
Stroke Article.

The judge then carefully analyzes this article, focusing on what evidence is
offered in support of which exact claims, and how it does not bear on the matter
at hand.115 In this sense, the judge engages in a scientific form of reasoning about
both the Yale HSP study and the more recent article. For example, in support
of her accepting the explanation of the plaintiffs’ expert that “a p-value cannot
provide evidence of lack of an effect,” the judge cites an epidemiological

110. Id. at 1240 (citing FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2000)).
111. See id. at 1240–41 (citing, inter alia, Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226, 1230–31 (9th
Cir. 1998), for otherwise useful, opposing, scientific-expert opinions and evidence as going to the weight
of the evidence, not to its admissibility).
112. Id. at 1242 n.11 (“Plaintiffs list over a dozen medical textbooks associating PPA with high
blood pressure and stroke. See, e.g., John C.M. Brust, Stroke and Substance Abuse, in UNCOMMON
CAUSES OF STROKE 132, 133 (Julian Bogousslavsky & Louis R. Caplan eds., 2001); THE LITTLE
BLACK BOOK OF NEUROLOGY 170–72 (James S. Bonner & Jo Jaeger Bonner eds., 2d ed. 1991).”)
(citation format modified).
113. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
114. In re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d at 1243.
115. Id. at 1243–44.
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handbook authored by one of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses.116 The third
section of the opinion, “Hemorrhagic Stroke in the Various ‘Sub-populations,’”
follows in the same vein, as the judge counters defense claims that it is
inappropriate to extrapolate the findings of the Yale study to men, children, or
people over age forty-nine.117 The judge cites medical literature to establish that,
in the matter of PPA and similar issues, it is standard medical practice to
extrapolate.118 She then cites legal precedent to show that such extrapolation has
been ruled admissible in other cases.119
In this third section and in a preceding subsection entitled “Recent Article
on Aneurysmal SAH [Subarachnoid Hemorrhage],” a challenge is raised by the
defense as to the scientific validity of claims made by the plaintiffs’ expert
witnesses.120 It is at this point that the judge again enters into scientific
reasoning. She is put in a position of adjudicating what is appropriate scientific
procedure and whether certain reported conclusions and findings count as
proper scientific knowledge so as to be admissible. Thus, the judge must sort
out conflicting claims, each presenting itself as defining appropriate scientific
behavior, in order to decide which claims will stand in court as admissible
expert testimony. In contrast to two earlier subsections of the opinion,121 in
which the judge was ruling on the general admissibility of a certain kind of
study, here the court must rule on specific contested claims.
In subsequent sections,122 the judge is drawn further into sorting out
conflicting scientific claims against the background of the scientific literature to
determine the admissibility of the testimony of two of the plaintiff’s expert
witnesses. Section four considers the testimony of Dr. Steven Levine on
Ischemic stroke potentially caused by PPA (as opposed to Hemorrhagic stroke,
which was the subject of the Yale HSP).123 Section five considers Dr. Irvin
Goldenberg’s testimony on potential PPA causation of cardiac injuries.124
Neither of these witnesses’ testimonies is supported by the “gold standard”
epidemiological study, and each must delve more deeply into other types of
studies in the scientific literature. As the judge notes, they bear a similarity to
each other in this way; they also bear a similarity to the cases litigated before
the publication of the Yale study. The judge applies a similar kind of
intertextual test to each and comes to opposite conclusions. The comparison is
instructive about the way this judge, at least, considers the cumulative value of
the scientific literature. The judge notes that Levine’s claim about the causation
of Ischemic stroke “rests on case and adverse drug reports, biological
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 1243 (citing KENNETH J. ROTHMAN, EPIDEMIOLOGY, AN INTRODUCTION (2002)).
Id. at 1244–46.
Id. at 1244–45.
Id. at 1245.
Id. at 1243–44.
See id. at 1239–43 (§§ 2(a)–(b)).
Id. at 1246 (§ 4, Ischemic Stroke); id. at 1249 (Cardiac Injuries).
Id.
Id. at 1250.
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plausibility, comparison to other sympathomimetics and naturally occurring
conditions with altered sympathetic tone, PPA blood pressure studies, textbook
and other references, and both [Levine’s] own and others’ clinical
experience.”125 She notes as well that “the lack of epidemiological evidence does
not render expert opinions on this issue unreliable” and again cites precedent
standing for the rule the weakness or flaws in scientific expert evidence go to its
weight, not to its admissibility.126 Because the volume of evidence is lower than
that respecting hemorrhagic stroke, the judge calls for a more detailed scrutiny
of that evidence.127 The judge rehearses the line of reasoning and evidence that
she finds plausible and relevant. Further, the judge repeats some of the citations
to the scientific literature that Levine relied on in supporting his own
reasoning.128 The judge concludes, “The court again finds that the cumulative
effect of this evidence satisfies the mandate of Daubert.”129
Although, superficially, Dr. Goldenberg’s expert testimony for the defense
followed a similar form of reasoning to Dr. Levine’s, the judge rules it
inadmissible:
Lacking epidemiological evidence, Dr. Goldenberg drew upon animal studies, human
clinical trials, case reports, clinical experience, comparison to other
sympathomimetics, and text book references. He testified as to, inter alia, biological
plausibility, temporal association, and dose response. Thus, at first glance, Dr.
130
Goldenberg’s methodology mirrors that employed by Dr. Levine.

Upon “closer analysis,” though, the judge finds “critical distinctions”
between the two experts. Dr. Goldenberg’s evidence “spreads far too thin to
reliably support expert testimony.”131 The judge finds, too, that Dr. Goldenberg
failed to offer any support for his opinion that “some thirty-five different
biological mechanisms” could account for the link between PPA and cardiac
injuries.132 Goldenberg’s “primary explanation” for that link was “PPA’s
vasoconstrictive effect”133; yet another expert witness for the defense had
testified that “PPA’s vasoconstrictive effect on coronary arteries was extremely
limited.”134
The judge notes other differences between Goldenberg’s testimony and
what was actually to be found in the literature. For example, whereas Dr.
Goldenberg presented testimony as to individuals consuming human
therapeutic doses of PPA, “three of the animal studies found no pathology at

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 1246.
Id. (citing Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226, 1229–30 (9th Cir. 1998)).
Id.
Id. at 1247.
Id. at 1248 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1250.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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doses significantly beyond human dose, including doses 1000 and 235 times that
level.”135
The judge goes on to remark that “beyond offering a few isolated examples,
Dr. Goldenberg only alluded to the . . . numerous textbooks and treatises
supporting his opinions.”136 The judge ruled that Goldenberg’s testimony was
inadmissible on the grounds that it “lack[ed] both the cumulative evidentiary
support and the thoroughness the court found reliable with respect to both
hemorrhagic and ischemic strokes.”137 Thus, the underlying issue seemed to be
how thoroughly the witness drew on the evidence in the literature and how
tightly he argued from it. The key to judicial evaluation of the admissibility of
an expert’s testimony, then, is the judge’s evaluating the expert’s use of the
scientific intertextual resources.
The Daubert standard of measuring scientific method, on its face, appears to
evaluate the experimental procedure, itself, as it certainly does in evaluating the
NEJM article that underlay the testimony of most of the plaintiffs’ expert
witnesses. Even then, it is ultimately a matter of the experts’ reading and
application of the literature. With a “gold standard” epidemiological study,
however, that becomes less problematic. But in the more problematic cases that
do not rely on a single, definitive study, admissibility was a matter of judging
how well, comprehensively, and carefully the literature was read by the
witnesses and how it was used to reason.
In the PPA products-liability case, the judge seemed willing to accept
something less than absolute certainty and judge according to the weight of
published evidence and the arguments based upon it, even when the most
authoritative kind of study was lacking. In fact, willingness to engage with the
literature leads the judge to admit expert testimony, so that the jury (should the
case reach a jury) can decide on the testimony’s value.
Judges in other cases have taken different positions on the requisite level of
certainty about causation to make evidence relevant and admissible in
determining liability.138 Notably, In re Phenylpropanolamine was a group action,
which puts the issue of statistical probabilities in a different light. The causality
can be considered in aggregate without sorting out whether it was more likely
than not to be the cause in each particular case. In that case, too, the judge
seemed willing to strike a balance between legal reasoning and scientific
reasoning on issues of admissibility. In many other PPA cases, the judges ruled
on admissibility only on legal grounds, without significant investigation of the
scientific literature—which frequently resulted in finding that defense
challenges raised sufficient doubt to rule the plaintiff’s expert testimony

135. Id. at 1251 (citing Daubert Hearing Record (May 29, 2003) at 75–76, 83–84).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Buxton v. Lil’ Drug Store Prods., Inc., No. 2:02-CV-178-KS-MTP, 2007 WL 2254492
(S.D. Miss. Aug. 01, 2007).
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inadmissible.139 On the other hand, other judges, as those in In re
Phenylpropanolamine and in Soldo,140 scrutinized the scientific literature and
practices engaged by the expert witnesses in order to determine the method
behind specific, detailed claims made by the witnesses. This scrutiny resulted in
giving credence to most of the shadows of doubt that defense attorneys
attempted to cast on the plaintiffs’ expert testimony, so as to render that
testimony inadmissible and to leave the defendant’s set of facts standing as the
facts of the case.141 In such a case, the court becomes full arbiter of what science
the fact finder is to hear and attempts to prevalidate what is to be admitted. In
Soldo, the result was summary judgment in favor of the defendants, for there
was no substantial case left for the plaintiffs once the expert testimony was
excluded.142 In taking a middle course, the judge in In re Phenylpropanolamine
took the scientific challenges seriously enough to examine their plausibility, but
did not foreclose evaluation of the credibility and relevance by a subsequent
fact finder.
V
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Science and the courts are distinct intertextual systems, with different
domains of relevant texts, different ways of deploying and reasoning with the
texts, and different methods of inscribing evidence from the nontextualized
world into their deliberations. Further, they each have limited admission of
texts from other domains, with procedures for admitting foreign texts, and
differing uses to be made of them. Neither science nor law is a homogenous
domain where texts flow freely. Judicial handling of legal texts is bounded by
national and state jurisdictions and hierarchies within jurisdictions. Scientific
literatures aggregate in disciplines, specialties, and theory groups, with criteria
of admission, attentiveness, and forms of reasoning appropriate to each, with
border controls and suspicion over immigrant texts from neighboring or moredistant scientific fields. Within each of the domains, the border controls are
determined by the inhabitants, not the neighbors. Rarely does the neighbor
have enough standing to negotiate, let alone demand, the terms of admission.
In the PPA litigation, even in the cases in which science seems to be treated
most even-handedly, the gatekeeping is entirely on the legal side of the border.
In the communal process of science, a complex discussion sorts itself out only
over time by what gets cited in ongoing publication, under no focused
institutional, situational exigency for immediate resolution. But when science is
applied to legal matters with judicial exigencies, it is the legal system that

139. See, e.g., id.
140. Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434 (W.D. Pa. 2003).
141. See id. at 576–77 (demonstrating domino effect of concluding plaintiff’s experts do not offer
scientifically reliable testimony).
142. Id. at 577.
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decides what meanings should be taken from the scientific literature and what
functional role those meanings will have in legal proceedings. The science is
carried across the border largely by selected agents within a strategically stagemanaged, advocacy proceeding. The science is filtered through the testimony of
the (mostly paid) expert witness, and then admissibility as scientific knowledge
is ruled on by a judge following legal reasoning within the intertext of the law.
As a result, the intertext of science has only a tenuous and filtered standing in
relation to specific cases. Scientific findings do not stand as effective and
prominent speech acts in themselves, establishing facts on the landscape that
must be attended to. Rather, the scientific literature is at best a warrant for the
expertise of the opinions expressed by individuals in the roles of expert
witnesses. It is those admissible acts of opinion that are potentially
consequential facts within the legal proceeding.
It offends science, which prides itself on both internationalism of
cooperation and universality of truth, if its truths and authority cannot flow
freely across borders. Yet these are different kinds of borders—borders of
human endeavors and activity systems. Intertextual analysis can help parse out
what the exact border regulations are and what gets across, with what use and
effect, according to the procedures established and judgments made by the
courts. But unless intertextual analysis finds some flimflam in the procedures, it
cannot pass judgment on what those procedures should be. It is up to the
participants in the various activity systems to sort out whether those procedures
meet their needs.
Nonetheless, scientists are also citizens, who expect their legal systems to act
justly. If their knowledge as scientists helps them identify injustice, then as
citizens they have the right and the obligation to ask the courts to redress
procedures to bring about justice in a complex world, about which science has
gained some knowledge. Moreover, since so many actors in the world are
themselves engaged with science as part of their actions (whether
pharmaceutical companies, environmental organizations, or silicon-chip
manufacturers), scientists are likely to have observations about the justice with
which these actors operate. The opinions of scientists might help us better
evaluate the legality and liability of parties acting with scientific knowledge.
Intertextual analysis might provide a means of identifying whether the most
credible science gets into court to have standing as significant fact with
appropriate bearing in the judicial deliberation.
Similarly, the courts are committed to justice, and their officers understand
that in many matters, scientific opinion must be factored in to reach just
conclusions. Accordingly, courts have adopted procedures, following judicial
forms of reasoning, to admit scientific and other expert opinions in ways that
will maintain the character and authority of their courts. If, in examining their
procedures, they find that the knowledge necessary to make just decisions is not
being admitted (that is, relevant facts are missing, not part of the record or
deliberations), or that the manner of admission is impeding knowledge from
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being used in the way most conducive to justice (that is, the perlocutionary
uptake of the speech act and fact is skewed), they must reconsider their
procedures. Again, intertextual analysis might serve as a useful tool for courts
to sort out whether their procedures lead to the most useful knowledge being
brought to bear on questions of justice in the most useful way.
My comments are professionally cautious, because evaluation of the use of
scientific knowledge in PPA cases involves knowledge and judgment of both
science and justice—in neither area do I have expertise. I bring only a mode of
analysis of literate activity systems to examine how they carry out their
deliberative work. However, as a citizen, from the vantage of my professional
knowledge, in becoming familiar with PPA litigation I have noted that the
current and recent procedures for admission of expert testimony have created
an opening for an aggressive strategy of challenge to keep scientific knowledge
from court, by casting shadows of doubt. That strategy has also created space
for pharmaceutical companies and other corporate actors in scientific arenas to
keep facts from being established in court by keeping findings from publication
and by sponsoring other publications that muddy the scientific waters.
This observation brings a third set of institutions into the analysis:
proprietary corporate organizations with their own sets of interests and modes
of operation. They also depend on their own complex intertextual systems;
nonetheless, because they appear in courts—usually as defendants—they are
treated as legal persons, insulated by the advocates who present their interests.
The intertextual systems within which they carry out their corporate
monitoring, reasoning, and governance are not available or accountable to the
court unless specific documents are subpoenaed or the defendants are charged
with fraud or malfeasance. Nonetheless, the corporate reasoning embodied in
their intertextual systems can indirectly affect the scientific intertext available to
the court. Further, through their advocates, they can make salient particular
parts of the legal intertext and can bring other suits that will change the legal
landscape. Finally, they may attempt to influence legislatures and government
agencies to affect laws, regulations, regulatory policies, and procedures, thereby
changing the larger context in which courts adjudicate. Thus we might best
consider the problem of science and the law as a three-body intertextual
problem—or ultimately an n-body problem, as regulatory agencies, consumer
groups, legislatures, and other players with their own intertexts of knowledge,
fact, and reasoning carry out their activities and define their interests. As with
any n-body problem, it is often useful to make simplifying assumptions based on
which systems exert the greatest gravitational force in each case.

